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Genesis



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African Peace Education: An Initiative for a Nonviolence Curriculum

by

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Abstract

This paper will critique problems resulting from military and, social conflict in five African nations, and offer ways to understand this conflict in an attempt to introduce new longitudinal and durable ideas for peace that can address the challenges of military and social conflict in contemporary Africa. The short-term approach in this exercise is to be able to convince our political leaders about the importance of peace education to support a long term approach that will enable academia to create a mandatory peace curriculum across the continent, and the world community that can effectively educate our future leaders about the essentiality of peace building in Africa.

Introduction

Africa is a vast and varied continent, thus African nations have different histories and geographical conditions, different stages of economic development, different sets of public policies and different patterns of internal and international interaction. Therefore the source of conflict in Africa reflect this diversity and complexity, hence some sources of conflicts are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region, and some have important international dimensions.

Yet, despite these differences the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and experiences. Among scholars and policy-makers, awareness is growing that young people in Africa hold the key to the continent's ability to realize the promises of an African renaissance. It is a truism that in all societies young people are "the future," but conditions in Africa make this truism especially relevant. Demographic trends reveal that African nations have extraordinarily high percentages of their populations (between the ages of 15-25) little access to education or employment, and hence, many are also vulnerable to challenges to their physical and mental wellbeing.

Consequently, many youth have to fend for themselves, their families, and communities. And fueled in part by these trends, they (African youth) figure prominently in several of the major conflicts in Africa, as soldiers and as civilian targets. At the same time, students and the urban dispossessed have been at the forefront of democratization movements in many parts of the continent as young people actively participate in religious organizations and other components of civil society aimed toward transforming the public sphere. And in some ways, the political and social mobilization of young people can be seen as claims to effective citizenship, and if so, new and deeper knowledge of African youth possibilities as citizens; and the broader conditions that impinge upon their possibilities is desperately needed.

These conditions also include global forces, hence a global economy that impinges on young people's life chances and provides a market for commodities that fuel war, a flow of new cultural goods and symbols that influence youth identities and relations with the older generation, compounded by universal discourses of democracy and human rights that emphasize certain definitions of citizenship (and not others). Accordingly, an examination of globalization and its impact upon African youth in a local-national social and historical context is needed, since global forces often intensifies the social exclusion many youth experience which in many respects don't provide opportunities for them to transform their situation.

Considering the above, this work will specifically examine the historical civil conflicts in Africa with special attention to conflict in Nigeria, Malawi, Cameroon, Ethiopia and Gabon. Secondly, I will discuss and analyze approaches to peace articulated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN) and other human rights organizations with ties to Africa. This examination will also provide data for my recommendation that the institution of the ideas of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Julius K. Nyerere, as a base for a developmental and theoretical plan to implement peace education throughout the formal and informal educational institutions in Africa.

Historical Context: National Unity

In the late 1950s until mid the 1960s, most of our people in Africa and the international community were aware that as Africa gained independence from the colonizers, life could be a safe haven for a new source of health. But what the world has witnessed is that some of our first African politicians who cried for freedom did not sow the seeds of democracy, accountability, and political responsibility. Instead, they fueled the continent with their personal interest, sectarianism, mismanagement, intolerance, and violence, and as a result, illiteracy, poverty, ignorance, and opportunistic leadership gripped the African continent, which has made it ripe for the military to organize opposition to the political elite consisting of the intelligentsia, students, workers, other popular groups who unceremoniously dismissed the politicians.¹

At the Berlin Conference in 1885, the colonial powers partitioned Africa into territorial units. Kingdoms, states and communities were arbitrarily divided; unrelated areas and peoples were arbitrarily joined together. Thus, in the 1960s, the newly independent African nations inherited those colonial boundaries and the challenges that legacy posed to their territorial integrity and attempts to achieve national unity. Also, the framework of colonial laws and institutions that some new nations inherited were designed to exploit local divisions, not to overcome them, which compounded the challenge. Understandably, the simultaneous tasks of nation building preoccupied many of the newly independent efforts while others were given a new momentum via the 1960 outbreak of secessionist fighting in the Katanga region of Congo. And furthermore, too often, the need to build national unity was pursued through the heavy centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism; and predictably, political monopolies often led to corruption, nepotism, complacency, and the abuse of power. And good, but also ironic, the era of serious conflict over national boundaries in Africa has largely passed, aided by the 1963 decision of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to accept the boundaries they had inherited from their colonial authorities.

¹ See Richard Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16, no. 2 (1978), pp 64-85. See also B. J. Dudley, *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973).

However, the challenge of forging a genuine national identity among disparate and often competing communities has remained, and the character of the commercial relations instituted by colonialism has also created long-term distortions in the political economy of Africa. For example, transportation networks and related physical infrastructure were designed to satisfy the needs of trade with the colonizer (metropolitan country), not to support the balanced growth of an indigenous economy. In addition, they frequently imposed unfavorable terms of trade, and thus economic activities were strongly skewed towards extractive industries and primary commodities for export, which stimulated little demand for steady and widespread improvements in the skill and educational level of the African workforce. The consequences of this pattern of production and exchange spilled over into post-independent Africa. Thus, political competition was not rooted in viable national economic systems, and in many instances the prevailing structure of incentives favored capturing the institutional remnants of the colonial economy for a factional advantage. For example, during the Cold War the ideological confrontation between East and West placed a premium on maintaining order and stability among friendly nations and allies, though superpower rivalries in Angola and elsewhere which contributed to some of Africa's longest and most deadly conflicts.

Further, across Africa, undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by competing superpowers in the name of their broader goals, but when the Cold War ended, Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself. Without external economic and political support, few African regimes could sustain the economic lifestyles to which they had become accustomed or maintain the permanent hold on political power they had come to expect. Therefore, a growing number of nations found themselves internally beset by unrest and violent conflict, as the world searched for a new global security framework; and for a brief period following the end of the Cold War, the international community was eager to exercise its newly acquired capacity for collective decision-making.

Then, beginning in the early 1990s, the UN's Security Council launched a series of ambitious peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives in Africa and elsewhere. Despite a number of important successes, the inability of the United Nations to restore peace to Somalia soured international support for conflict intervention and thus precipitated a rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. Accordingly, an early and direct consequence of this retreat was the failure of the international community, including the United Nations, to intervene to prevent genocide in Rwanda. That failure has had especially profound consequences in Africa, and now throughout the continent, the perception of near indifference on the part of the international community has left a poisonous legacy which continues to undermine confidence in the United Nation.

Considering the above, we can now turn to the plight of five African nations (Nigeria, Malawi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Gabon) to briefly examine their social, economic and political trials and tribulations.

Nigeria: Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress?

First, we will look at Nigeria, and in doing this we can reflect on its motto of unity, faith, peace and progress. On October 1, 1960 when Nigeria gained her independence, most African nations thought Nigeria would serve as a catalyst/example for the rest of the continent. Nigeria could have played that role, but the major setback for the new political development was the introduction of a military regime. Hence, the Nigerian elite started a culture of undemocratic and unaccountable government that has crippled the continent.

Nigerian's major problem relates to its military and weak political parties structured to serve the interest of the individual rather the interest of society at large. For example, the First Republic (1963 -- 1966) was run like a leaderless, disorganized soccer team. The Prime Minister and ceremonial President did not get along, the army was not sure as to who had final authority to give orders. Traditional rulers had an overarching influence over politicians, the political parties remained based in the regions; and the center (i.e., the federal government) was less attractive and less credible than the regional governments, some of which maintained embassies abroad and even took some foreign policy positions that ran counter to those of the federal government.

Given the fragmentation and suffocation of civil society, the general political immaturity of the new leaders, their opportunism, and the inability of the post-colonial structure to contain or mediate the constraints of underdevelopment, domination, and dependence, it was clear by 1965 that the nation was headed for disaster.² The first coup was experienced in January 1966, followed by another in July of the same year. Civil war broke out in 1967 when the eastern region wanted to break away from the weak Federation. That civil war lasted for thirty months and it was estimated that more than a million people were killed. And whether Nigeria likes it or not, most people, especially the Igbo, have not recovered from the war. Thus, the nation needs healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation more than ever. There is no doubt that the military intervention has crippled the national development and progress which has prevented new politicians with an opportunity to learn from their mistakes, strengthen their constituencies, and forge the kinds of political alliances that can contain crisis and instability. And in addition, military rule has closed existing democratic spaces, promoted civil disobedience, encouraged waste and corruption, and most of all, it encourages political arrogance, intolerance, and generally undemocratic attitudes.

² See Billy Dudley, *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973).

Moreover, the military created the civil war, and carried out policies which became landmarks in the country's political terrain, including the creation of several states, a new national anthem and currency, a constitution fashioned after the United States Presidential model, a new federal capital in Abuja, the creation of political institutions and agencies to facilitate administration, the establishment of several educational institutions, and more. However, these innovations have been insufficient to strengthen civil society, check corruption and irresponsibility, and ensure the effective utilization of scarce resources. Yet, one can see that some of these institutions were designed to place military hegemony over society, and promote corruption. And most interesting, Jean-Germain Gros has noted that in Nigeria, the best time to loot the treasury is under military rule, because this almost guarantees that the excess will not be probed.³ It is reasoned that this will be a practice of yesterday, as the nation of 120 million (estimated) consisting of 36 states, headed by Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua will sincerely structure itself to be a home for unity, faith, peace and progress.

Malawi: From Banda to Democracy

Second, we can quickly turn to Malawi. Malawi has an old political song whose lyrics say, "*Zonse zimene za Kamuzu Banda*," which means "Everything whatsoever belongs to Kamuzu Banda". In short, this song was used to be a source of amusement to determine the things that could be said to belong to Kamuzu Banda. The song went on to say, "*Misewu yonse, ya Kamuzu Banda* (all the roads belong to Kamuzu Banda), *azimayi onse, ya Kamuzu Banda* (all the women belong to Kamuzu Banda)", and so on. The only line that had to be filled in was "All X", where X could be almost anything imaginable, from shoes to houses, from rivers even to heaven. In Malawi, it was witnessed in the post-independence period that a political power had come to be concentrated in the hands of one individual, and that individual was then His Excellency, Life President, Ngwazi Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, and thus give him his respect.

Accordingly, Jean-Germain documented that, in his thirty years of existence as an independent sovereign nation, Malawi came to attain the rare and dubious distinction of shifting from a one-party state to a one-man state.⁴ Indeed, President Banda viewed the nation, as an extension of his household and ruled it as though he were ruling a family compound, as his actions and choice of words indicated. Malawi started off as an "economic slum" lacking exploitable minerals, but her economic salvation lay in the exploitation of the land and labor. The land as in any other nation became the most important source of economic progress. However, in the creation of a middle class, which would be a buffer between the rich few and the poor masses, the land apportionment was extremely skewed.

³ Jean-Germain Gros, "Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa", *Coping with Uncertainty* p.61 University Press, 1973).

⁴ Jean-Germain Gros, "Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa", *Coping with Uncertainty* p. 21.

⁵ Jean-Germain Gros, "Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa", *Coping with Uncertainty*, p. 21.

President Banda built personal palaces and expensive schools named after him that Black people were not allowed to teach in; medical and educational facilities began to decline, and the majority merely eked out an existence. Thus, the policies that accounted for such “capitalism at its most rapacious” and could only foment resistance and discontent. And it was necessary to control the population to ensure that resistance did not erupt into political activism, as the machinery for repression took care of that.⁵ Malawi knew nothing but authoritarianism and it was highly personalized and the advanced age of Banda posed a dilemma for the regime. Conducting a fair election was out of the question, and succession was also problematic, since Banda had no political heir related to him by blood, thus everyone knew or at least suspected that Mama Kadzamira’s uncle, John Tembom, was being groomed for the post. In May 1983 a special session of Parliament was convened to ratify the appointment of John Tembo as acting President, while President Banda was on “sabbatical” leave in Britain for one year. This unconstitutional move was led by two senior ministers, Aaron Gadama, Minister of the Central Region and a relative of President Banda, and Dick Matenje, Secretary General and Administrative Secretary of the Malawi Congress Party. Later, they were executed along with Twaibu Sangala, Minister of Health, and David Chiwanga, Member of Parliament, although a staged traffic accident was used to account for their death and their funeral rights were denied.

This sad state of national affairs in Malawi was noted in a verse by the renowned poet Jack Mapanje who, for his “irritating” poetry, was detained for three-and-a-half years (1987-90) in Mikuyu Detention Camp near Zomba. In his poem *No Creon, There’s No Virtue in Howling*, Mapanje writes:

No, Creon, you overstate your image to your People.

No, there’s no virtue in howling so.

How can you hope to repair Harmon, your

Own blood, our only hope for the throne,

By reproaching his body mangled by your

Decree and put to rest without the requiem

Of our master drums?⁶

⁶ Jack Mapanje, *The Chattering Wagtails of Kikuyu Prison* (London: Heinemann, 1985). p.12.

This incident not only highlighted the brazenness with which the Banda-Kadzamira-Tembo triumvirate could eliminate opposition, but also served to galvanize the conscience of the Malawi population. There was no doubt that this gave a new rallying point for the externally based and largely fragmented opposition groups. However, in 1993 through a national vote, a multi-party democracy, a Presidential council was formed, the life presidency was abolished and a new constitution was put into effect wherein in 1994 the first multi-party elections were held, which is still in place today, although there have been accusations of unfair election practices and the suppression of opposition leveled against various parties in several elections. Thus, like other nations in Africa, Malawi is also in need of new ideas for nonviolence and peace.

Cameroon: *Paix - Travail – Patrie*

Every African country has its own story towards democratization, and certainly Cameroon, a former French colony and also part of British Cameroon which merged in 1961 to form the present nation is no exception. The year 1990 could be viewed as the year Cameroon attempted to embrace democracy through a number of factors. In November 6, 1982, the government changed hands when President Ahidjo stepped down and was succeeded by Paul Biya. Sensing that the national mood was for freedom, Biya embarked on sermonizing for democracy. Promises are cheap; President Biya had no idea what trouble was waiting for him. However, his brand of democracy was going to be a peculiar one where democracy was placed within the hands of a one-party state. This was to be a long and drawn-out process. Between January and March of 1986, a plurality of candidates fought to be elected to the basic organs of a single party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement. Hence in 1987 candidates for political office competed in local council elections, and on April 24 in 1988, a plurality of candidates vied to be elected to the national Parliament. Yet, it failed to deliver the people from the claws of authoritarian rule, the entire experience, but it did prepare Cameroonians for the "real thing," which became a categorical imperative in 1990, in spite of the regime's best attempt to delay its arrival for as long as possible. In other words, the limited democratic opening experienced under President Biya created expectations that the regime was certainly not prepared to fulfill, but could hardly ignore.⁷

⁷ Jean-Germain Gros, *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa Coping with Uncertainty*. cit., p. 43.

Second, in the 1980s the Cameroonian economy was in very poor shape, during the 1988-89 fiscal year, the Gross Domestic Production dropped to 2.867 billion. Hence, the state budget was reduced from 800 billion to 550 billion CFA Francs.⁸ Faced with this gloomy economic picture, the government could no longer justify remaining in power, much less monopolizing of power.

Many other African governments that faced this same predicament witnessed erosion of their legitimacy. They could not deliver the goods so they lost credibility. The bitter experience of economic mal-performance thus made Cameroon a candidate for democracy as it robbed the hitherto authoritarian political system of its legitimacy. And in short, democratization in Cameroon can be explained by (1) the yet-to-be-resolved question of what it means to be a Cameroonian, (2) laws and institutions (e.g., the military) that do not make for democratic governance, (3) economic stagnation, and (4) an undemocratic power structure and culture inherited from colonialism that has made the country too dependent on France.⁹ As it is with some African countries, Cameroon can be characterize as a center involving a: lack of accountability to civil society, lack of respect for the rule of law wherein makers and enforcers of laws consider themselves above the law, the crippling regulatory burden on the private sector, that puts entrepreneurs at the mercy of political elite's; rapacious bureaucrats, and capricious allocation of scarce resources. Notwithstanding, budgetary authorizations and appropriations generally reflecting the relative power of the Cameroon bureaucratic elite and donor preferences; especially those of France, rather than the economic priorities of the state and the intrinsic merits of development projects has stymied progress .

Furthermore, fractionalization of the opposition and unrelenting French backing of the regime has stymied Cameroon's democratic transition. There was confusion among opposition parties along ethnic, regional, linguistic, and religious lines, and personality differences among opposition leaders which the ruling party has cleverly used these cleavages to sow disputes, rancor, and suspicion inside the opposition. And for many opposition parties, the main issue is not so much how to ease out the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement party (CPDM), but who will take over from Paul Biya as President. In real democratic society all candidates should focus the on issues, not ethnic, regional, linguistic or religious differences. Yet, the unpatriotic formulation of the problem of governance in Cameroon has made the opposition as much a part of the problem as the ruling CPDM.

⁸ Ndi Mbarga provides details of the somber economic state of Cameroon in *Reptures of Continuite au Cameroon* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1993).

⁹ Jean-Germain Gros, *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa Copong with Uncertainty*, p. 47

Cameroon is a country at the periphery of international capitalism, led by a pro-France political class, exploits and oppresses the masses of for the benefits of a dependent, domestic bourgeoisie and certain factions of the French bourgeoisie. As Richard Joseph has remarked, “the vicious cycle in which Cameroon has been caught by encouraging the importation of capital through facilitating its outflow in the form of profits is true of every regime in Yaounde, colonial or postcolonial”.¹⁰ The “vicious cycle,” according to Gavin Williams, has thus “promoted the development of capitalism, foreign and domestic, by shifting resources from more competitive to less competitive producers; from craft to factory production; from agriculture to industry; from rural to urban areas; from the poor to the rich. It has promoted the wealth of the nation, but only by the impoverishment of the people.”¹¹ And most interesting, peace is one of the words in its national motto (in addition to ‘work’ and ‘fatherland’): paix, travail, patrie. Future challenges in Cameroon will perhaps rest in how power is restructured (especially in the presidency), how corruption is curbed, and how demands from its English speaking population for complete reform are mediated.

Ethiopia: Quest for Democratic Governance

The quest for democratic governance in Ethiopia did not begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall or in the euphoria that followed in its wake throughout Africa. It has been the heart of modern Ethiopia political life and will continue to be until the underlying issues that gave that quest its raison that d’être are satisfactorily resolved.¹² The struggle for democratic governance in Ethiopia from at least from 1974 - 1995 can be best summarized as follows. Ethiopian politics has essentially been about how best to incorporate the different “nations” that make up the Ethiopian nation, --- first the empire state, and after 1974, the Marxist state --- without trampling on popular aspirations for local and regional autonomy from centralized authority. And although the initial expectations and promises of building Ethiopia on democratic principles and structures were present, both Emperor Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam eventually dropped all pretenses of adhering to those ideals and resorted to force to preserve the national unity and, more importantly for them, they worked secure their own power. However, they both failed, with tragic consequences for their respective regimes and Ethiopia as a whole. And correspondingly, Ethiopia has a fascinating history, hence a history worth a tangible review.

¹⁰ Richard Joseph, ed., *Gaullist Africa: Cameroon Under Almadu Ahidjo* (Enugu, Nigeria:)

¹¹ Gavin Williams, ed., *Nigeria: Economy and Society* (London, UK: Rex Collings, 1976), p. 56.

¹² Jean-Germain Gros, ed., *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty*.

Strategically Ethiopia is located in the region commonly known as the horn of Africa and with a population of over 50 million people inhabiting a territory of about 1.1 million square kilometers, Ethiopia is a land of diversity, a mosaic of ethnic and language groups, cultures, contrasting ecological zones, and physical configurations. The marked ethnic heterogeneity of the polity is an outcome of protracted migration and continuous settlements resulting from conquests, displacements, and resettlements. The varied demographic distribution pertaining to the different ecological zones has been influenced by topography, climate, and historical occurrences, which in turn explains the entrenchment of predominant livelihood systems and peculiar modes of existence relating to the different peoples and localities. According to Kuhlman, amid bewildering variations some important patterns can, nonetheless, be discerned.¹³

In spite of the fact that historical relationships between the peoples of Ethiopia have gone through complex and intricate processes of disharmony and conflict over the years, ample instances of amity and peaceful coexistence also have been featured. Thus, the Collision-collusion syndrome could be explained by the lust for control and hegemony on the one hand and common denominators revolving around mutual interests and complementary affinities on the other. And available historical records bring to light the fact that the initiation of the state took shape in the northern part centuries before the birth of Christ with the formation of the Axumite kingdom.

During subsequent periods, the kingdom of Axum transformed a quasi-empire by annexing and incorporating territories and localities around and beyond the Red Sea coastal regions and frontiers to the south away from the center.¹⁴ In order to understand the complexity of the Ethiopian Empire, one has to account for its ethnicity. The new polity included diverse national and religious groups with differing economies, ideologies, and kinship systems. Apart from striving to retain whatever lands were at its disposal, the state was simultaneously engaged in the exercise of territorial expansion by way of annexation and incorporation of new principalities. Thus, with an admixture of diplomacy and military prowess, Menelik II ruled over a formidable empire, and therefore responsible for ushering in the phenomenon of “modernity” on the one hand and the subjugation of peoples of the annexed territories on the other.

¹³ Thomas Kuhlman, *Asylum or Aid? The Economic Integration of Ethiopian Refugees in the Sudan* (Leiden, Netherlands: African Studies Center, 1994).

¹⁴ Tadesse Tamrat, *Church and State in Ethiopia: 1270-1527* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1972). See also B. Thomson, *Ethiopia: The Country That Cut Off Its Head* (London, UK: Robson Books, 1975).

Hence, according to Bulcha, the coercive annexation of the peoples of the conquered territories to facilitate the creation of the Empire State became the incarnation of all kinds of alienation and marginalization, thereby forming the basis upon which future antagonisms that have proved detrimental to the polity have flourished.¹⁵ Markakis agrees with this thesis when he argues that the expansion stored great potential for conflict in the nature of the relationships between those who controlled the state and those who became its subjects.¹⁶ With some qualifying corrections, Addis Hiwot appears to concur with Bulcha and Markakis, he stated: “After the creation of the multi-national empire state by the feudal principality, especially after the conquest and effective occupation and incorporation of the south, southwestern and southeastern areas, a classical system of feudal serfdom was established. An extensive process of land confiscation and the enslavement of the indigenous peasants took place. The religious, cultural and linguistic differences between the feudal conquistadors and the indigenous peoples gave the process of enslavement to a brutal dimension”.¹⁷ It should be taken into account that not all the people in the north benefited from such an enterprise, but also is the ruling classes and the soldiers that participated in it for the gains.

Correspondingly, the most noticeable confusion to the Ethiopian people was the Land Reform Act of 1975, which terminated exploitative landlords and other similar measures, which initially created a formidable constituency of support in favor of the revolution. At this time different groups started their own struggle: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Movement (EPRP), Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF), Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) all wanted their own piece of the pie. Religious institutions, trade unions, and professional associations—in short, civil society itself—were not immune from these abuses. The private sector, particularly the wealthy members of the business community who were labeled economic saboteurs, was not spared. Many were subjected to long-term imprisonment or killed while others were dismissed, carrying with them the specter of some unidentified misfortune that might visit them in the future. Bloody purges also visited military personnel in different divisions and barracks. Chaos, anarchy, and terror entangled the entire country, with the exception of the strongholds of the Tigrayan and Eritrean guerrillas in the remote corners of their respective regions. People were required to surrender, in a gradual and piecemeal manner, the gains of the early years of the revolution.

¹⁵ Mark Bulcha, *Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan* (Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1988).

¹⁶ John Markakis, “Ethnic Conflict and state in the Horn of Africa,” in K. Fuki and J. Markakis, ed., *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London: James Currey, 1994).

¹⁷ Addis Hiwot, “Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution,” *Review of African Political Economy* (1975).

Demobilization and de-politicization replaced participation; locally elected representatives gave way to handpicked favorites; consultation and consensus building were supplanted by orders from above. The relative autonomy of all components of civil society was eventually wiped out without a trace. Harbison sums up the situation that led to the nullification of the expected outcomes of land reform as follows:

*The implementation of the land reform has yielded generally extremely modest, discouraging results for reasons attributable to an implementation strategy featuring inadequate farmgate prices, diversion of administrative resources from agricultural to regime maintenance purposes, extreme concentration of scarce public resources on state farms at the expense of a majority of rural producers, inadequate support for agricultural research, energetic but only partially effective efforts to restrict the access of rural producers to private traders, and excessive centralization and bureaucratization of administrative machinery.*¹⁸

The problem of Ethiopia is not the recognition of this principle as a democratic ideal. As Bahru cautioned, "To deny the principle of national self-determination is both unprincipled and impolitic. But to elevate that principle—which is only a working principle—to the level of creed and not to relate it to the country's pressing economic needs and the international context in which it finds itself can only bring trouble".¹⁹

However, opposition to how Ethiopia conducts business has been challenged in the U.S. by former residents via The Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007 which passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on October 2, 2007. In short, the bill called for the U.S. to (1) support human rights, democracy, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, peacekeeping capacity building, and economic development in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; (2) collaborate with Ethiopia in the Global War on Terror; (3) seek the release of all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Ethiopia; (4) foster stability, democracy, and economic development in the region; (5) support humanitarian assistance efforts, especially in the Ogaden region; and (6) strengthen U.S.-Ethiopian relations.

¹⁸ Jean-Germain Gross, *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty*, Grenn Wood Press 1998, p. 85.

¹⁹ Bahru Zewde, "Haile Selassie: From Progressive to Reactionary," paper presented at the Sixth Michigan State University Conference on Northeast Africa. East Lansing, MI, April 1992.

Furthermore, the bill directs the Secretary of State to take specified actions to support human rights and democratization in Ethiopia, prohibits until the President makes specified congressional certifications: (1) security assistance to Ethiopia, with exceptions for peacekeeping, military education and training for civilian personnel, or counter-terrorism assistance; and (2) U.S. entry of any Ethiopian official involved in giving orders to use lethal force against peaceful demonstrators or accused of gross human rights violations, and government security personnel involved in specified shootings of demonstrators or prisoners, or murdering Etenesh Yemam. And most important, it also call upon the government of Ethiopia to: (1) release all remaining political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, especially prisoners held without charge; and (2) allow full access to the Ogaden region by humanitarian aid organizations and international human rights investigators.

Unfortunately, the bill has never become law, it was received in the Senate and read twice and then referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, however its aims reflect a wish for real democratic reform in Ethiopia as it directs concern for Ethiopian torture victims, and a request for the government of Ethiopia to enter into discussions with peaceful political groups to bring them into full participation in Ethiopia's political and economic affairs.

Gabon

In “*Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa*,” Peter Ekeh explains that in postcolonial Africa, political actors are tied to two public realms.²⁰ On the one hand, they are part of a civic public from which they gain materially but fail to honor with the duties of a “good citizen.” On the other hand, they belong to a primordial public (e.g., an extended family, a whole ethnic group) from which they derive intangible gains of identity and psychological security.

In Gabon, the path to democratic reform has been fraught with roadblocks and frustrations. Omar Bongo, Gabon’s long-time President, initially tried to trivialize opposition demands. He was among the first African incumbents to convene a democratic National Conference in April 1990 and subsequently to organize multiparty legislative and Presidential elections in 1993.

²⁰ Peter P. Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no 1 (January 1975), pp. 91-112.

Nelson N. Messone and Jean-Germain Gros explain in “*The Ivory of Wealth: Democratization in Gabon*” that “Resource imbalance is perhaps the most significant advantage that incumbents have over insurgents in Africa. State resources, whose evaporation need not be explained to the general public, because of the absence of accountability government, enhance incumbents’ ability to respond to pressures to unseat them. With economic power, they may preempt the military’s temptation to trade them for a rival or to initiate a coup. Resources also allow them incumbents to buy off their civilian opponents by offering them cabinet posts and cash.”²¹

In Gabon however, this type of practice is known as the passing of the envelope. If you wash my back, I will wash your back no matter how the general public needs education, medical food, good roads, etc. Unqualified people are put in position for the sake of passing of the envelope. As we know it today, Gabon gained her independence on August 17, 1960 while Nigeria was on October 1, 1960. From 1944 to independence in Gabon, competitive politics was vibrant but with much vicissitudes. At independence three political figures emerged: Paul Indjenjet Gondjout, Leon M’ba, and Jean-Hilaire Aubame. These men led the major parties of that period namely: *Bloc Democratique Gabonias*, *Union Democratique et Socialiste Gabonaise*, with *Parti du Regroupement Africain*. Mba became President at the end but ran into irreconcilable differences with his opponent Jean-Hilaire Aubame in the coalition government that was formed. Mba wanted to avoid confusion, so he decided to call for new elections but a group of four young officers staged a coup in 1964 and Mba was forced to resign and Aubame was made head of a provisional government. At this time, France led its first military intervention in Gabon to restore Mba to power without an official request from Gabon. This intervention that was carried out by France caused protests throughout Africa and the world. Mba was finally restored to power, but having his power back did not make life easy for him. In March 1964, Mba arrested 150 opponents, the military and some members of the provisional government, and they were all given long jail sentences or banned from politics. These long jail sentences did not prevent some of the opposition-repression. They continued to give Mba headaches until Leon M’ba was admitted to hospital and died on November 27, 1967. The Constitution was amended to make Bongo his successor as President in February 1967. When Bongo became President, he did not escape the irreconcilable differences that his predecessor left him.

²¹ Nelson N. Messone and Jean-Germain Gros explains in “The Ivory of Wealth: Democratization in Gabon ”, *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa*,” Copying with Uncertainty, Grenn Wood Press 1998.

In March 1968, Bongo declared Gabon a one-party state by dissolving the BDG and establishing a new party--the *Parti Democratique Gabonais* (PDG). He invited all Gabonese, regardless of previous political affiliation, to participate. Bongo was elected President in February 1975; in April 1975, the office of vice President was abolished and replaced by the office of prime minister, who had no right to automatic succession. Bongo was re-elected President in December 1979 and November 1986 to 7-year terms. Using the PDG as a tool to submerge the regional and ethnic rivalries that divided Gabonese politics in the past, Bongo sought to forge a single national movement in support of the government's development policies.

Afterward, economic discontent and a desire for political liberalization provoked violent demonstrations and strikes by students and workers in early 1990. In response to grievances by workers, Bongo negotiated with them on a sector-by-sector basis, making significant wage concessions. In addition, he promised to open up the PDG and to organize a national political conference in March-April 1990 to discuss Gabon's future political system. The PDG and 74 political organizations attended the conference. Participants essentially divided into two loose coalitions, the ruling PDG and its allies, and the United Front of Opposition Associations and Parties, consisting of the breakaway Morena Fundamental and the Gabonese Progress Party.

The April 1990 conference approved sweeping political reforms, including creation of a national Senate, decentralization of the budgetary process, freedom of assembly and press, and cancellation of the exit visa requirement. In an attempt to guide the political system's transformation to multiparty democracy, Bongo resigned as PDG chairman and created a transitional government headed by a new Prime Minister, Casimir Oye-Mba. The Gabonese Social Democratic Grouping (RSDG), as the resulting government was called, was smaller than the previous government and included representatives from several opposition parties in its cabinet. The RSDG drafted a provisional constitution in May 1990 that provided a basic bill of rights and an independent judiciary but retained strong executive powers for the President. After further review by a constitutional committee and the National Assembly, this document came into force in March 1991. Under the 1991 constitution, in the event of the President's death, the prime minister, the National Assembly President, and the defense minister were to share power until a new election could be held. However, opposition to the PDG continued, and in September 1990, two coup d'etat attempts were uncovered and aborted. Despite anti-government demonstrations after the untimely death of an opposition leader, the first multiparty National Assembly elections in almost 30 years took place in September-October 1990, with the PDG garnering a large majority.

Then, following President Bongo's re-election in December 1993 with 51% of the vote, opposition candidates refused to validate the election results. Serious civil disturbances led to an agreement between the government and opposition factions to work toward a political settlement. These talks led to the *Paris Accords* in November 1994, under which several opposition figures were included in a government of national unity. This arrangement soon broke down, however, and the 1996 and 1997 legislative and municipal elections provided the background for renewed partisan politics. The PDG won a landslide victory in the legislative election, but several major cities, including Libreville, elected opposition mayors during the 1997 local election.

Facing a divided opposition, President Bongo coasted to easy re-election in December 1998, with large majorities of the vote while his major opponents rejected the outcome as fraudulent, and some international observers characterized the results as representative despite any perceived irregularities, however there were no civil disturbances after the 1993 election. Peaceful though flawed legislative elections were held in 2001-02, which were boycotted by a number of smaller opposition parties and were widely criticized for their administrative weaknesses, produced a National Assembly almost completely dominated by the PDG and allied independents. In November 2005, President Bongo was elected for his sixth term (he won re-election easily), but opponents claim that the balloting process was marred by irregularities. There were some instances of violence following the announcement of Bongo's win, but Gabon generally remained peaceful. And more currently, in 2006 National Assembly elections were held where several seats contested because of voting irregularities, but later overturned by the Constitutional Court, as a subsequent run-off election in early 2007 again yielded a PDG-controlled National Assembly.

In short, the politics of Gabon is troublesome; the nation is dominated by a strong presidency and the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), which has remained in power since 1968. The country's human rights record is poor with reports of: limited ability of citizens to change their government; use of excessive force, including torture, on prisoners and detainees; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; an inefficient judiciary susceptible to government influence; restrictions on the right to privacy; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, association, and movement; harassment of refugees by security forces; widespread government corruption; violence and societal discrimination against women, persons with HIV/AIDS, and noncitizen Africans; trafficking in persons, particularly children; and forced labor and child labor. Unfortunately, we can conclude that the politics of Gabon under President Bongo has been a protracted game of calculated political manipulation.

The above review of the historical and contemporary situation Nigeria, Malawi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Gabon provides a glimpse of the social, economic and political trials and tribulations of Africa. The advent of civil war in Nigeria has hindered national unity, the multi-party elections were not held in Malawi until 1994 previously locked nothing but authoritarianism and a highly personalized government, Cameroon has been characterize as a center of a lack of accountability to civil society, and a lack of respect for the rule of law wherein makers and enforcers of laws consider themselves above the law with a crippling regulatory burden on the private sector that place entrepreneurs at the mercy of the political elite, Ethiopia's history is bound via Emperor Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam who disregarded all pretenses of adhering to democratic ideals to instead resort to force to preserve national unity and secure their personal power juxtaposing an oppositional cadre in the U.S. demanding greater freedom and human rights, and last, Gabon, a nation dominated by a strong President, willing to play any and all sectors of society in a game of illusions to stay in power.

Organization of African Unity: Foiled Approach to Peace?

When the founders created the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 25, 1963, headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, they had in mind that the organization should promote continental peace, unity, and cooperation throughout Africa. Then many members believe they were actually engaged in resolving conflicts between nations and coordinating political, economic, cultural, scientific, medical, and defense policies. However, at the time of formation many disagreed about what kind of organization the OAU should be. Some leaders pushed for the creation of a central government that would unite Africa under one authority, but at that time (1963), most African nations had just gained independence from colonial rule, so most opposed the idea.

After much debate, the leaders finally came to an agreement, but in so doing, they created an organization controlled by its member nations, leaving it with little power to act on its own. Thus, they had three major governing bodies: the Assembly of the Head of States and governments, the Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat. The Assembly consisted of a representative from each member nation that meets once a year to discuss policy and consider recommendations from the Council of Ministers. Each year a different African leader become chair of the OAU and handles disputes among member nations. The Council of Ministers was headed by the foreign minister of each member nation that meets at least twice during the year to recommend policies and actions to the assembly. The General Secretariat headed the day-to-day operations of the organization with a secretary general, which helped to build consensus among member nations. And most interesting, since founding of the OAU it has been troubled by disputes among its member nations.

For example, in 1975 the organization's members became divided over which side to support in the Angola civil war after they gained independence from Portugal in 1974. This split continued during a series of wars, including the 1977 and 1978 invasions of the Katanga Province in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) by Angola-backed forces, Somalia's war with Ethiopia in 1978, and the conflicts between Uganda and Tanzania in 1978 and 1979. In 1981 the same nations that supported the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho (MPLA) government in Angola also recognized the Western Sahara as an independent state, and admitted it into the OAU. Morocco and other states that supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* or UNITA) and The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (*Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola* or FNLA) side of the Angolan conflict did not approve of this move. Thus, Morocco temporarily withdrew from OAU, and simultaneously, its strength was sapped further by an accelerating economic decline in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s.


However, apart from its problems, the organization has served Africa well, it was bold by facing the colonial master to end colonialism and bring independence to most African countries, it mediated a border dispute between Algeria and Morocco in 1964 and 1965. And in a two-year period from 1968 through 1970, the OAU mediated border conflicts between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. In order to defeat Portuguese colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, the OAU created the African Liberation Committee. This movement was victorious in 1974, and also supported the movement against white minority rule in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. The OAU was courageous enough to exclude South Africa from its membership until 1994 when white minority rule and apartheid ended. Furthermore, the same year the OAU was formed (1963), it sent a representative to the United Nation (UN) as an observer which allows representatives of a nation or organization that is not a member of the UN to participate in its discussions, although observer missions cannot vote on UN actions. The OAU also coordinated collective action among African nations in the UN, promoted decisions that led to South Africa being barred from participating in the UN's general assembly in 1974, and helped to gain admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN in 1971. In 1986 the OAU established the African Commission on Human and People's Rights to monitor human rights practices in member nations. And subsequently, the OAU was revived when Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim was elected as Secretary General. Under his leadership, the organization established a new mechanism for conflict resolution and a peace fund to deal with a growing number of conflicts. Hence, Salim is one of the Africa's most respected statesmen, and thus s brought prestige to the organization; he was thus elected twice in 1993 and 1997, since his first elected post in 1990.

Continuing, in 1994 African nations ratified an OAU initiative to establish an African Economic Community that would promote trade between African nations and remove tariffs, work towards establishing a common currency in Africa, and processes for removing other restrictions that hamper commercial exchange. And in the same year (1994), South Africa became a member and therefore, it was very vocal in terms of peace, democracy, and economic development for the entire continent since the end of apartheid. Hence, with Salim's leadership and South Africa's support, the OAU had a chance to become a stronger and more effective organization.

In respect to peace, in October 1999 the OAU released a document titled the *Enhancing Peace and Security in Africa: The OAU's Programme for Strengthening Conflict Management Centre* which outlined a number of issues including the challenge of ensuring Africa's security. Hence, a comprehensive framework for strengthening a mechanism for a Conflict Management Center linked to the OAU via regional economic commissions, and the United Nations. In the document, the OAU believed that by improving their policies they would eliminate or prevent conflict from occurring, thus their framework articulated that: the organization and member nations needed the political will to develop an effective and robust mechanism for conflict management; defined measures to enhance decision-making capacity in the area of conflict management; an identification of key tools and capabilities required for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and the organization's priorities for developing these; an identification of the resources required to develop the tools and capabilities required; and a framework for mobilizing resources and support for capacity-building programs.²²

Since the release of the document in 1999, a number of conflicts have erupted, for example, the religious conflict in Nigeria wherein Muslims and Christians are in regular fights; hence hundreds of people have been killed due to their religious belief. Second, the Congo situation is not yet dealt with; there is an on-going land dispute in South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe; situations in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are still troubling. Yet, in most cases, the OAU has been weak in its response. For example, in 2000 when there was heavy flooding in Mozambique, the OAU could not supply one helicopter to rescue people (same as today in Darfur region of western Sudan), and in general, African leaders did not respond favorably. OAU had hoped the Framework (Enhancing Peace and Security in Africa) would result in improved policy making by enhancing capacity to: take informed decisions in addressing conflict in Africa; analyze and understand issues affecting Africa security and develop strategic options to address them; propose new initiatives to the Central Organ for managing conflict affecting its members; and the capacity to enable the OAU to assume center stage in the thinking and planning of peace operations in Africa.

²² OAU Report, *Enhancing Peace and Security in Africa: The OAU's program for strengthening the Conflict Management Center*, October 1999, PG 7.



(This chart illustrates the OAU Conflict Management Center)²³

Thus, the OAU also hoped to improve cooperation by: increasing synergy among the various institutions responsible for decision-making and implementation of peace operations in the region; increasing synergy between the conflict management mechanisms adopted by the sub-regional organizations and the activities of the United Nations; adding more institutionalized linkages between the OAU and sub-regional organizations, the regional economic communities and civil society, and between the OAU and the United Nations; establishing a wider pool of grassroots information sources; benefiting from the insights and experience of knowledgeable members of civil society to provide a broader scope and context to its conflict management efforts; access to a wider range of mediators and facilitators, thereby reducing the pressure on OAU staff; and by engaging an institutionalized OAU-wide culture of involvement in the management of security.²⁴

Retrospectively, in addition to the above, in 1972, OAU officials had a convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa whereupon they agreed upon (although they failed to act upon it) a declaration, stating: “We Heads of State and Government of Member States of the Organization of African Unity, considering the grave threat which the activities of mercenaries represent to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and harmonious development of Member States of OAU, considering that total solidarity and co-operation between Member States are indispensable for putting an end, once and for all, to the subversive activities of mercenaries in Africa, decided to take all necessary measures to eradicate from the African continent the scourge that the mercenary system represents.

²³ OAU Report, *Enhancing Peace and Security in Africa: The OAU’s programme for Strengthening the Conflict Management Centre*, October 1999.

²⁴ OAU Report, *Enhancing Peace and Security in Africa: The OAU’s programme for Strengthening the Conflict Management Centre*, October 1999, pg 7.

We agree on the following: [article one] under the present Convention a 'mercenary' is classified as anyone who, not a national of the state against which his actions are directed, is employed, enrolls or links himself willingly to a person, group or organization whose aim is: (a) to overthrow by force of arms or by any other means the government of that Member State of the Organization of African Unity; (b) to undermine the independence, territorial integrity or normal working of the institutions of the said State; (c) to block by any means the activities of any liberation movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity. Hence, [article two] the actions of a mercenary, in the meaning of Article One of the present Convention, constitute offences considered as crimes against the peace and security of Africa and punishable as such; second, anyone who recruits or takes part in the recruitment of a mercenary, or in training, or in financing his activities or who gives him protection, commits a crime. Whereas [article three], the member states of the Organization of African Unity, signatories to the present Convention, undertake to take all necessary measures to eradicate from the African continent the activities of mercenaries. To this end, each State undertakes particularly: (a) to prevent their nationals or foreigners living in their territory from committing any of the offences defined in Article Two of the present Convention; (b) to prevent the entry to or the passage through their territory of any mercenary or equipment intended for their use; (c) to forbid in their territory any activity by organizations or individuals who employ mercenaries against the African States Members of the Organization of African Unity; (d) to communicate to other Member States of the Organization of African Unity any information, as soon as it comes to their knowledge, relating to the activities of mercenaries in Africa; (e) to forbid on their territory the recruitment, training or equipping of mercenaries or the financing of their activities; (f) to take as soon as possible all necessary legislative measures for the implementation of the present Convention. And whereas, [article four] every contracting state undertakes to impose severe penalties for offences defined in Article Two of the present Convention. Whereas, [article five] every contracting State undertakes to take the measures necessary to punish any individual found in its territory who has committed one of the offences defined in Article Two of the present Convention, if he does not hand him over to the State against which the offence has been committed or would have been committed. Whereas, [article six] in accordance with the provisions of Article Seven of the present Convention, the offences defined in Article Two above should be considered as offences calling for extradition.

Therefore, [article seven] a request for extradition cannot be rejected, unless the State from which it is sought undertakes to prosecute the offender in accordance with the provisions of Article Five of the present Convention; when a national is the subject of the request for extradition, the state from which it is sought must, if it refuses, undertake prosecution of the offence committed; if, in accordance with sections 1 and 2 of this Article, prosecution is undertaken, the state from which extradition is sought will notify the outcome of such prosecution to the state seeking extradition and to any other interested Member State of the Organization of African Unity; and thus a state will be regarded as an interested party for the outcome of a prosecution as defined in section 3 of this Article if the offence has some connection with its territory or militates against its interests.²⁵

Considering the above, the OAU had good intentions, but it unfortunately lacked the integrity, courage, commitment and the ability to uplift the continent of Africa. All the laws were in place, there are an abundance resources in the continent, however, it was, and in many ways today, vulnerable to a host of insurmountable problems. And as a result, a new approach is needed for Africa to develop within its potential as a world leader in human, economic, political, and technological affairs.

United Nation's Peace Approach

In 1980 like the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations had a similar convention on mercenaries, and also set agreements made during their sessions, hence: reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of all threats to international peace and security; bearing in mind the need for the strict observance of the principles of equality, sovereign independence, territorial integrity and self-determination of all peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; recognizing in particular that the General Assembly and the Security Council in several resolutions have condemned the activities of mercenaries aimed at overthrowing the governments of member states or jeopardizing the legitimate interests of national liberation movements; considering the urgent need by the international community to co-operate and to exercise utmost vigilance against the danger posed by the activities of mercenaries by all States in the interest of international peace and security; and therefore convinced that an international convention against

²⁵ OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CM/433/Rev.L, Annex 1 (1972).
University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, web site:
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/mercenaryconvention.html>

the activities of mercenaries faithfully implemented will provide an effective collective measure against the menace of mercenaries. And have thus agreed that the state party, which has suffered damages by reason of the commission of the offence mentioned in article 2 of this Convention, may also claim damages or reparation against any state parties jointly or severally for any act or omission which constitutes the offence, however a claim for damages or reparation may only be considered when attempts to secure criminal prosecution have failed.

And second, via Article 16 of the settlement of disputes, (1) any dispute between two or more state parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation, shall at the request of any one of them be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of the parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the statute of the Court; (2) each state party may at the time of signature, or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this article. The other state parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 of this article with respect to any state party, which has made such a reservation, and last, any state party, which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.²⁶

Accordingly, credit must still be given to the United Nations (UN) for their contribution to peacekeeping, famine relief, human rights, assisting decolonization, and economic development in Africa, even though they have failed in many areas. There is no doubt that Africa has been the site of some of the United Nation's greatest achievements, as well as its biggest failures. The UN played an important role in assuring many African colonies' peaceful transition to independence, and it has since mobilized successful international campaigns for children's health and the eradication of diseases. And of course, UN-sponsored diplomacy has helped resolve a number of long-running conflicts, especially in Southern Africa. However, long-term solutions to chronic poverty, social inequality, and political instability in Africa have eluded the UN, and the questionable effectiveness of UN peacekeeping troops in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s has provoked widespread criticism in Africa and abroad.

²⁶ International Convention Against The Activities of Mercenaries: U.N. Doc. A/35/add.1, at 10-16- (1980)., University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, web site: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/mercenaryconvention.html>

And in this regard, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan eloquently spoke of the UN, African leaders and the international communities' failure in his UN report on April 1998 to the United Nations Security Council entitled, "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa", saying that:

"By not averting these colossal human tragedies, African leaders have failed the peoples of Africa; the international community has failed them; the United Nations has failed them. We have failed them by not adequately addressing the causes of conflict; by not doing enough to ensure peace; and by our repeated inability to create the conditions for sustainable development. This is the reality of Africa's recent past. It is a reality that must be confronted honestly and constructively by all concerned if the people of Africa are to enjoy the human security and economic opportunities they seek and deserve".

Kofi Annan's assessment thus echoed a September 25, 1997 Security Council convention of foreign ministers consideration of the need for a concerted international effort to promote peace and security in Africa wherein they said despite the progress achieved by some African nations, the number and intensity of armed conflicts on the continent remained a matter of grave concern, requiring a comprehensive response. Thus the Council requested that Annan submit a report regarding the sources of conflict in Africa, and ways to prevent and address those conflicts; and how to lay the foundation for durable peace and economic growth following their resolution. Hence, the above mentioned "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa" document.

Africa as a whole has begun to make significant economic and political progress in recent years, but in many parts of the continent progress remains threatened or impeded by conflict. For the United Nations there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment, and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the United Nations. Genuine and lasting prevention is the means to achieve that mission.²⁷

Unquestionably, conflict in Africa poses a major challenge to United Nations efforts to ensure global peace, prosperity, and human rights for all; although it was intended to deal with inter-state warfare, as we can see, it is being required more and more to respond to intra-state instability and conflict, spending billions of dollars in the process. And in those conflicts, unfortunately, the main aim, increasingly, is the destruction not just of armies, but of civilians and entire ethnic groups. Hence, preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies, it's a matter of defending humanity.

²⁷ Kofi Annan: The Causes of conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa.

Retrospectively, since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-nation (state) in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees, and displaced persons. The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples.²⁸ The Rwandan genocide and other civil conflicts made refugee crisis one of the UN's chief concerns in Africa in the 1990s. In 1995 the UN high commissioner for refugees estimated that some 4.5 million refugees from 30 African nations were in need of assistance.²⁹ There have been numerous programs that the UN has brought to Africa, for example, The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) which runs many programs to improve agricultural and nutrition, a program that was introduced in Zimbabwe in 1996 to reduce pesticide use through the introduction of natural predators, crop rotation, and disease-resistant plant varieties; and a 1993 erosion control plan in Burundi encouraged tree, shrub, and grass planting. The United Nations Development Program also devotes about 25 percent of its aid to food-related projects in Africa. Yet warfare and drought, among other factors, have led to repeated regional food shortages since the 1960s, including famines in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa in the 1970s and mid-1980s, and in Sudan in the late 1990s.

Also, since the early 1980s the UN's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank, has engaged most countries in Africa in multi-year programs to reduce high national debts and promote economic growth, also known as "Structural Adjustment Programs" (SAP) that tie multilateral loans to economic reforms, such as price and currency deregulation and the privatization of national enterprises. The World Bank also provides funds for many development projects in Africa as well as technical assistance and project evaluation. In the 1990s, the World Bank became Africa's largest source of loan funds.³⁰ It is obvious that our five above mentioned nations, Nigeria, Malawi, Gabon, Cameroon and Ethiopia along with the United Nation (UN), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)'s method of establishing a durable peace of Africa has not worked, and disappointedly will not work. Thus, perhaps we need to look outside Africa for some answers this most critical issue, with a mix of philosophy involving the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and then return to President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania to acquire a long awaited solution to Africa's problem. And in this search, I suggest that philosophy of Nyerere and King can become a model and an initiative for developing a curriculum focused on peace and nonviolence; hence, an African peace education initiative.

²⁸ Kofi Annan: The Causes of conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa.

²⁹ *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience*, United Nations in Africa p. 1919.

³⁰ *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience*, United Nations in Africa, p. 1919

Martin Luther King Jr. and Julius K. Nyerere: Rational for Selection

Some may ask why should Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere be selected as peace models for Africa? My simple answer is that the proposed African Peace Education Initiative (APEI) represents an honoring of the life and good work of two great world leaders, and a quest to demonstrate a unity of purpose among people in Africa and other parts of the world. As a result, the curriculum proposal represents a new approach to peace education and honors two leaders who stood tall for economic equity, justice, and peace for their nations and the international community.

Second, the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere will inspire young children not only in Africa, but worldwide to new heights. Martin Luther King was a clergyman, Nobel Prize winner, principal leader of the Civil Rights Movement, and an advocate of nonviolent protest, and most paramount, he presented a challenge to segregation and racial discrimination in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States of America. His life and work include research and implementation of the ideas of nonviolent protest presented by Mohandas Gandhi of India; he presiding over the Montgomery Improvement Association which organized the Montgomery bus boycott which sparked a new thinking and pride among African Americans in the fight for social justice; he organized the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization of African American churches and ministers that aimed to challenge racial segregation and discrimination; he encouraged the use of nonviolent direct action to protest discrimination (marches, demonstrations, and boycotts); he utilized critical thinking in his decision making; he stood firm with local clergymen who had criticized him for creating disorder, which prompted him to write "Letter From Birmingham Jail" from a jail cell in Birmingham, Alabama which included the now famous statement "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere"; he lead the 1963 March on Washington whereupon he delivered a stirring address to an audience of more than 200,000 titled "I Have a Dream", which expressed the hope that the U.S. will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed that all are created equal which created a climate for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited segregation in public accommodations as well as discrimination in education and employment; he criticized U.S. involvement in Vietnam; and he called for the redistribution of U.S. wealth to overcome entrenched poverty.

Likewise, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere was also an example of human dignity and strength. In 1960 at Wellesley College, he said "the Africa that we must create must be an Africa which the outside world will look at and say: If you really to to see free people who live up to their ideals of human society, go to Africa. That is the continent of hope for the human race", he emphasized cooperation and moral values; gently but firmly made a case for the independence of Tanzania (then Tanganyika) through non-violence; he was one of Africa's greatest leaders; he was loved by his people right up to the time of his death; he was an intellectual and international peace broker;

he promoted self reliance; he put the interest of his people above his own; he ruled through a one-party system yet he was regarded as the premier democrat in Africa; he promoted the use of Swahili as the national language in Tanzania; he was honest; he opened his country to freedom fighters from Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and welcomed them as family; he supported the unity of humanity; he was a co-founder of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a leading figure in the Non-Aligned Movement; he brought energy, vigor and direction to the OAU; he promoted African culture; he extended an invitation to African people from around the world to come to Tanzania and participate in building a socialist African nation; he expanded the educational system of Tanzania and a sense of national unity unmarked by ethnic unrest. And toward the end of his life, he channeled all his energies in efforts to end armed conflicts in Africa, and thus, he was asked by the OAU to act as facilitator to get the warring parties in Burundi to negotiate a political settlement, which he accepted until he had to stop due to his poor health.

The dedication of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere to humanity, based on the above and other reasons is the reason why we can start with them as icons of peace for Africa as we propose a comprehensive African peace movement emerged within a scientific curriculum.

And indeed, we have enough data to construct such a curriculum, even with Martin Luther King, Jr. alone, curriculum has been developed, most notably via the work of Civil Rights Movement activist, minister, educator and lecturer Bernard LaFayette, Jr. of the Center for Nonviolence and Peace Studies at the University of Rhode Island who introduced me to the philosophy of Kingian Nonviolence which has its roots in the collective leadership era of Martin Luther King, Jr. via intellectual investigation and social action.³¹ Considering my understanding through learning the principles of Kingian Nonviolence, I also became aware of how it can be incorporated or at least introduced Africa by starting with the six principles of nonviolence articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. as described (The Six Principles of Nonviolence) in his first book, *Stride Towards Freedom* focused on his personal reflections during the Montgomery Movement (1954-1956) and its overall meaning for society. Thus, his six principles of nonviolence, and their explanations involve:

Nonviolence is a way of life for courageous people: it is a positive force confronting the forces of justice, and utilizes the righteous indignation and the spiritual, emotional, and intellectual capabilities of people as the vital force for change and reconciliation.

³¹ Jehnsen David C. and Lafayette, Bernard, Jr., *The Leaders Manual: A Structure Guide and Introduction to Kingian Nonviolence: The Philosophy and Methodology*, p. 45.

The Beloved Community is the framework for the future: the nonviolent concept is an overall effort to achieve a reconciled world by raising the level of relationships among people to a height where justice prevails and persons attain their full human potential.

Attack forces of evil, not persons doing evil: the nonviolent approach helps one analyze the fundamental conditions, policies, and practices of the conflict rather than reacting to one's opponents or their personalities.

Accept suffering without retaliation for the sake of the cause to achieve the goal: self-chosen suffering is redemptive and helps the movement grow in a spiritual as well as a humanitarian dimension. The moral authority of voluntary suffering for a goal communicates the concern to one's own friends and community as well as to the opponent.

Principle Five: Avoid internal violence of the spirit as well as external physical violence: the nonviolent attitude permeates all aspects of the campaign. It provides a mirror type reflection of the reality of the condition to one's opponent and the community at large. Specific activities must be designed to help maintain a high level of spirit and morale during a nonviolent campaign.

The universe is on the side of justice: truth is universal and human society and each human being is oriented to the just sense of order of the universe. The fundamental values in all of the world's great religions include the concept that the moral arc of the universe bends toward justice. For the nonviolent practitioner, nonviolence introduces a new moral context in which nonviolence is both the means and the end.

And to the surprise of many, these six principles have been introduced in Africa via the work of Bernard LaFayette, Jr. at the Center for Nonviolence and Peace Studies at the University of Rhode Island, and through The African Diaspora Foundation (www.theadf.com), a non-profit peace education organization based in Los Angeles, California with representatives currently in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia. This initial introduction is promising, and indeed requires us to use our imaginations, resources, and skills to advance the future of Africa, and all humankind.

Imagine A World: A MKL-JKN Nonviolence Curriculum

Momentarily, let us imagine a world where: children practice playground diplomacy, settling their own disputes peaceably, without fighting and without guns; you can attend a university whose whole curriculum specializes in peace studies; a place where technology for peace is as big a business as the technology for war; ideological opponents search for common ground on controversial issues and work together to solve the problem; political and religious leaders apologize for oppression of racial or ethnic groups and seek ways to right the wrongs; and where governments have cabinet-level Departments of Peace.

Can you imagine such a world? Wouldn't it be wonderful if the values of peace were so deep in our culture that they were routinely expressed in these and countless other ways? In fact, many of these are already happening, in small pockets around the world. The rest exist as seeds, planted in the minds of pioneers, waiting to find fertile soil in the ground of our society in order to grow and blossom (think of the African Peace Education Initiative as the watering can).

Power and influence are important for everyone, regardless of age. Children learn about power from their earliest days. At first, because they are small and helpless, then they learn that adults have power and they don't, then they begin to find ways to exert influence on their environment, and if they cannot find positive ways to do this, they will find and develop negative ways. Children are an essential part of our family and community life, thus, they need to have a meaningful voice at home and school in the decisions that affect their lives. To be able to honor a nonviolent society, children also need to have the experience of being empowered to speak, to choose, and to question. There is no better place to achieve this, than in the school environment as we recognize that peace requires healing and reconciliation; and that what appears broken must and can be mended, if we are to know peace as a way of life. But that way of life must start with the children. However, sometimes our grievances are against a whole group, or "the system," making it hard to find a partner in the healing process. That's okay. We do what we can by ourselves or with whoever is willing to join us in the healing journey. And in my opinion, the journey must start with the children. This is why the African Education Initiative (APEI) is a child driven initiative.

And most importantly, APEI is proposed for all schools in Africa as a start in the journey to eliminate conflicts and embrace peace. Presently, many children in Africa are being destroyed due to endless violence and conflict, and thus our future leaders are being destroyed by adult ineffectiveness. To change this quagmire, I suggest that the APEI operate as a 30-year project to engage the public, the international community, and teachers in a clear understanding of the roots of human conflict, and the principles of nonviolence and peacemaking via instruction modules in the arena of nonviolence philosophy, peace, conflict resolution, and reconciliation that can be employed in the classroom based on the African experience, historically and presently.

The APEI Certification of Educators

Hence, the first line of operations, next to the actual curriculum will be the certification of a cadre of educators (teachers). Therefore, as a preliminary start, the APEI will focus on a six-teen week intensive multi-media peace and nonviolence teacher certificate program for teachers from select African nations. Hence, teachers should be selected based on the recommendations of their school, application, and general ability to complete the program. All candidates should have at least a four-year undergraduate degree, or its equivalent to participate.

Hence, we can reason that if taken seriously, via APEI many of the African problems can be solved by educating the next generation (children and youth) in the language of peace and nonviolence in accord with the development of a just and peaceful world community. And therefore, the APEI calls upon individuals, communities and organizations (economic, social, educational) from around the world to form an alliance to place a new generation of educators (teachers) in the educational institutions of Africa to advance a curriculum of peace education focused upon the nonviolence principles of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the statesmanship of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere which can allow for the formation of longitudinal efforts to bring peace and economic development to establish a new democratic identity for Africa.

In this proposal, certainty, more detail will be needed to ensure success, but initially, students and teachers will participate in the curriculum and report on its effectiveness in relationship to individual and group communication. Thus, all involved should know how to conduct or at least identify sources of human conflict, techniques for reducing conflict, negotiating, bargaining strategy, alternative dispute resolution techniques (e.g. mediation, arbitration), cross-cultural difference awareness/negotiation, and solutions to interpersonal conflict. And second, an overall evaluation plan will be introduced consisting of strategies (formative and summative) that will engage the qualitative in nature of this proposal, and a formative evaluation via interviews and open-ended questionnaires wherein participants (teachers) will be asked about the operation of their education, the materials, and other questions to provide feedback for the ongoing improvement of the project.

Hence, a project evaluator will be expected to meet regularly with staff to share findings from the formative evaluation effort as periodic reports will be prepared to identify the major findings of the formative evaluation and determine how they can be used to improve the operation of the initiative. And correspondingly, a summative evaluation will begin with the establishment of baseline data at the beginning of the project and then be conducted at 6-month intervals focused on the four primary goals of the initiative and the objectives of each division. And last, an annual report will be issued that presents the formative and summative findings of this proposal within an African centered paradigm of peace and nonviolence education³².

³² Zulu, Itibari M. *Exploring the African Centered Paradigm: Discourse and Innovation in African World Community Studies*. Los Angeles: Amen-Ra Theological Seminary Press, 1999, pp. 73-95.

Conclusion

In his conclusion of his report on Africa to the UN Security Council, former Secretary General Kofi Annan, he said:

*In this report I set out to provide a clear and candid analysis of the sources of conflicts in Africa and the reasons why they persist. I have recommended actions and goals that are both realistic and achievable to reduce conflict and in time help to build a strong and durable peace. I have urged Africans and non-Africans alike to summon the political will to rise to the challenge, which together we must all confront. The time is long past when anyone could claim ignorance about what was happening in Africa, or what was needed to achieve progress. The time is also past when the responsibilities for producing change could be shifted on to other shoulders. It is a responsibility that we must all face. The United Nations stands ready to play its part. So must the world. So must Africa.*³³

And in the same fashion, Martin Luther King, Jr. said in *Stride Toward Freedom* (p.224):

This a great hour for the Negro. The challenge is here. To become the instrument of great idea is a privilege that history gives only occasionally. Arnold Toynbee says in A Study of History that it may be the Negro who will give the new spiritual dynamic to Western civilization that it so desperately need to survive. I hope this is possible. The spiritual power that the Negro can radiate to the world comes from love, understanding, good will, and nonviolence. It may even be possible for the Negro, through adherence to nonviolence, so to challenge the nations of the world that they will seriously seek an alternative to war and destruction. In a day when Sputniks and Explorers dash through outer space and guided ballistic missiles are carving highways of death through the stratosphere, nobody can win a war. Today the choice is no longer between violence and nonviolence. It is either nonviolence or nonexistence. The Negro may be God's appeal to this age—an age drifting rapidly to its doom. The eternal appeal takes the form of a warning: "All who take the sword will perish by the sword."

Today, I ask, what will happen to African children if we fail to adopt a nonviolence education curriculum? Perhaps the answer rest with us as we work to make history and thus implement a curriculum of peace.

³³ Kofi Annan: The Causes of conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa.

In his introduction to *The Martin Luther King, Jr., Companion: Quotations from the Speeches, Essays, and books of Martin Luther King, Jr.*, Dexter Scott King pointed out that:

To most young people history is just that, with no relevance to the present or future. With our new technologies and newfound freedoms, what can we learn from a civil rights movement that took place before this generation was born? If we cannot understand and respect the lessons, which our ancestors learned through hard struggle, then we are condemned to relive those same struggles over and over again. If history has taught us nothing else, it has taught us that.

Indeed, the thoughts of Dexter Scott King and Kofi Annan (and others not mentioned) should vibrate within us, we must understand that if we cannot understand and respect the lessons of the past, we are condemned to repeat them, thus time has passed when the responsibilities for producing change could be shifted to the shoulders of others, now it is our turn, our responsibility.

Today we must demand that African leaders assign peacemaking as the number one priority in the continent. And no longer should those in the academy teach African problems, but of African solutions, African alternatives based on the best ideas and practices of Africa and her Diaspora. Maybe we can entertain a “blue print of Africa’s future”, and start with an African peace education proposal. Maybe after all the OAU and UN war sessions and reports, we can consider an educational approach to peace in Africa which can be as aggressive as the English were in teaching English in Nigeria, or the Portuguese was in Angola in teaching Portuguese. Maybe it is time to teach the language of peace in Africa, with an estimated 2,000 languages in Africa (Nigeria alone has 250 languages), I am sure we can find space for another in our highly linguistic diverse environment to be a part of our mass media and educational establishments?

Now is the time for Africa to embrace a peace education curriculum, hence a language of peace and nonviolence, a space where the world can say yes, in Africa, they have a culture and a language of peace we must duplicate to save the planet.

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African Diaspora Foundation
During A Time of Peace Concert at UCLA Royce Hall
September 22, 2006

Dear Friends

I send warm greetings from South Africa to all of you and especially to Jeannette Ndhlovu our Consul-General in Los Angeles who I believe is supporting this event tonight. I commend the Agape International Spiritual Centre and the African Diaspora Foundation on the quest for peace on which your organizations have embarked. I pray that your endeavours will bear fruit.

I am thrilled that the African Diaspora Foundation is dedicated to peace building and peace making in Africa and in other parts of our global village. The development of peace curricula, teachers and support programs that promote non-violence and reconciliation is crucial for our continent. There can be no progress where people live in fear and where power is maintained through the barrel of a gun.

Thank you for supporting this Time of Peace Conference. A time of peace will only come if we work for peace. We must talk and most of all, listen to each other, to be humble and to learn from one another. Guns and weapons leave a wasteland of destruction, fear and despair. Dialogue affirms dignity and builds trust. This is the way forward to create stable, prosperous communities where there is caring, compassion and respect for all.

We must learn to celebrate our diversity and embrace each other. Ultimately we are one family, the human family, God's family.

God bless you

+Desmond M Tutu Archbishop Emeritus







SA Consul General -LA attends leadership summit for global peace



Consul General Jeanette Ndhlovu with former President of the Republic of Cape Verde, His Excellency Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro and his wife at the African Diaspora Foundation (ADF) Global Peace Leadership Summit, Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles. Former President Monteiro is a current Fellow of Boston University's African Presidential Archives & Research Center. The event was also attended by His Excellency Jerry Rawlings, former President of Ghana and his wife. The African Diaspora Foundation is dedicated to developing peace centers, peace curricula, teachers, and to supporting outreach programs that promote peace, nonviolence and reconciliation in Africa and other parts of the world. (Photo and story - Consul General Los Angeles)



















